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Goins v. Angelone
226 F.3d 312 (4th Cir. 2000)
I. Facts
On October 14, 1994, Christopher Goins ("Goins") and Barry Scott
("Scott") went to the home of fourteen-year-old Tamika Jones ("Jones"),
who was seven months pregnant with Goins's child. Scott attempted to
show Goins an ultrasound photograph of his unborn child, and he became
angry. Goins proceeded to shoot all of the members of Jones's family,
killing her parents, her four-year-old brother, her nine-year-old sister, and
her three-year-old brother. Goins also shot Jones nine times. Her twenty-
one-month-old sister, Kenya, was shot once. Neither Jones nor Kenya were
killed, but Jones's injuries necessitated a hysterectomy and resulted in the
termination of her pregnancy.'
Approximately one month after the shooting, Goins was arrested in
New York. On June 13, 1995, a jury convicted Goins on one count of
capital murder, four counts of first-degree murder, two counts of malicious
wounding and seven counts of illegal use of a firearm. The jury sentenced
him to death for the capital murder charge, and to four life terms plus
seventy-eight years for the non-capital offenses.2
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the conviction and sentence?
The United States Supreme Court denied Goins's petition for a writ of
certiorari.4 Goins then filed a habeas corpus petition in the Supreme Court
of Virginia, which was dismissed.5 The Circuit Court scheduled Goins's
execution for September 15, 1997 and on September 5, 1997, Goins sought
a stay of execution and appointment of counsel to prepare a federal habeas
petition.6 The district court granted these requests.7 Goins then filed a
petition for federal habeas relief on thirty-six separate grounds, which the
district court denied in turn.'
1. Goins v. Angelone, 226 F.3d 312, 315-16 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Goins v. Com-
monwealth, 470 S.E.2d 114, 119-22 (Va. 1996)).
2. Id. at 317-19.
3. Id. at 319; see Goins, 470 S.E.2d at 132.
4. Goins, 226 F.3d at 319; see Goins v. Virginia, 519 U.S. 887 (1996).
5. Goins, 226 F.3d at 319.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.; see Goins v. Angelone, 52 F. Supp. 2d 638, 649-81 (E.D. Va. 1999).
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Goins made the following assertions on appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit:9 (1) the district court erred in
failing to allow voirdire questions regarding racial bias;'0 (2) the court erred
in denying his motion to voir dire prospective jurors individually;1 and (3)
his counsel failed to attempt a second change of venue after the first motion
resulted in a venue that produced a predominantly white jury. 2
II. Holding
The Fourth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability and dismissed
Goins's appeal. 3
9. Goins, 226 F.3d at 319. Because several of Goins's claims were summarily dismissed
by the court and failed to raise significant issues, they will not be discussed in detail in this
note. First, Goins contended that the prosecution, in violation of Brady, failed to reveal the
results of a polygraph examination administered to Scott, a friend, whom the defense posited
committed the murders. Id. at 325; see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding
that exculpatory evidence must be disclosed to defense counsel). The Fourth Circuit rejected
this claim because there was no basis to conclude that the results of the polygraph were
favorable to the defendant or that disclosure would have had any direct impact on the trial.
Goins, 226 F.3d at 325.
Goins also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel on several grounds. Id. at 327. The
court denied relief on each ground because Goins could not establish that counsel's perfor-
mance was unreasonable, or that it prejudiced the trial or the sentencing. Id.
Next, Goins contended that the district court erred in denying his motions for discov-
ery and an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 328. The court dismissed this claim because Goins
failed to allege facts that, if true, would warrant an evidentiary hearing. Id.
Finally, Goins argued that he was improperly excluded from bench conferences during
the guilt phase of the trial. Id. at 327. The Supreme Court of Virginia held this claim to be
procedurally defaulted because Goins failed to raise the issue during trial or on direct appeal.
Id.; see Slayton v. Parrigan, 205 S.E.2d 680,682 (Va. 1974) (prohibiting state habeas review of
claims that were available to petitioner at trial or on direct appeal, if petitioner failed to raise
them at that time). Goins failed to show that there was "cause for, and actual prejudice from,
the default" or that the "failure to review the claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage
of justice." Goins, 226 F.3d at 328 (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,749-50 (1991)
(barring federal habeas review unless petitioner can show that (1) there is cause for, and actual
prejudice from, the default; or (2) the failure to review the claim would result in a fundamen-
tal miscarriage of justice)). The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of this
claim. Goins, 226 F.3d at 328.
Goins also asserted that evidence of his parole eligibility was erroneously excluded
during voir dire and sentencing. Id. at 326. For a discussion of the court's treatment of this
claim, see Christina S. Pignatelli, Case Note, 13 CAP. DEF. J.403 (2001) (analyzing parole
ineligibility in Goins and in Bacon v. Lee, 225 F.3d 470 (4th Cir. 2000)).
10. Goins, 226 F.3d at 320-24.
11. Id. at 324-25.
12. Id. at 322 n.4, 327.
13. Id. at 319.
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III. Analysis /Application in Virginia
A. Voir Dire Regarding Racial Bias
Goinsargued that he should have been allowed to ask the following
two questions during voir dire: (1) "Have you ever experienced fear of a
person of another race? If so, what were the circumstances?" and (2) "Do
you think that African-Americans are more likely to commit crimes that
whites? If so, why?"14 The trial court did not permit these inquiries and
Goins claimed that this refusal was error because "they were relevant to
establishing relationship, interest, opinion or prejudice."" The Supreme
Court of Virginia found that the trial court properly used its discretion in
determining appropriate questions for voir dire and, thus, did not violate
Goins's rights.1 The Fourth Circuit upheld this adjudication on the merits
because the state court's determination was not "contrary to," nor did it
involve "unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.""
The Fourth Circuit pointed out that voir dire is carried out in the
discretion of the trial judge, who should determine which questions are
appropriate'for revealing prejudices.1" However, the court also noted that
trial courts are constitutionally required to allow a defendant to ask ques-
tions regarding racial prejudice when "special circumstances" indicate that
racial issues are "inextricably bound up with the conduct of the trial." 9 The
question is whether the facts of a case demonstrate a "constitutionally
significant likelihood that, absent questioning about racial prejudice, the
jurors would not be as 'indifferent as [they stand] unsworne. "'20
The Fourth Circuit then looked at three Supreme Court cases to
determine what constitutes such "special circumstances."" In Ristaino v.
Ross,22 the defendant, an African-American, was charged with a violent
crime against a Caucasian. 2 The Court concluded that these facts did not
14. Id. at 320.
15. Id. (quoting Goins, 470 S.E.2d at 124-25).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 324; seeAnti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
104, 110 Stat. 1214,1218-19 (1996) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. S 2254 (Supp. IMI 1997))
(mandating that adjudication on the merits may not be overturned on federal habeas review
unless the state court's determination "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable applica-
tion of, dearly established federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court").
18. Goins, 226 F.3d at 321 (citing United States v. Barber, 80 F.3d 964, 967 (4th Cir.
1996) (en banc)).
19. Id. (citing Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 597 (1976)).
20. Id. (citing Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 596).
21. Id. at 321-22.
22. 424 U.S. 589 (1976).
23. Goins, 226 F.3d at 321; see Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 597 (1976) (stating that
commission of violent crime by an African-American against a Caucasian did not rise to the
level of 'special circumstances" requiring racial questions during voir dire).
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"create a.. . need of constitutional dimensions" to voir dire potential jurors
about racial bias."' In contrast, the Court in Ham v. South Carolina"5 found
that when an African-American man charged with possession of marijuana
claimed that he was framed by law enforcement officers because of his
participation in civil rights activities, the "special circumstances" test was
met and the racial issues present were "inextricably bound up with the
conduct of the trial."
26
In Turner v. Murray,27 an interracial murder resulted in a capital trial.
Here, the Supreme Court diverged from its holding in Ristaino and con-
cluded that the trial court is "constitutionally required to permit voir dire"
regarding racial prejudices because "capital sentencing proceedings require
jurors to make a 'highly subjective, unique, individualized judgment regard-
ing the punishment that a particular person deserves.'" 29 The Turner Court
also noted that the danger 6f racial bias when the result is so final makes the
capital sentencing process "especially serious."3"
Goins asserted that such "special circumstances" existed in his trial and
that racial issues were "inextricably bound up with the conduct of the
trial."" Namely, Goins argued that his predominantly white jury raised
such racial issues." The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument pointing out
that there is "no constitutional presumption of juror bias for or against
members of any particular racial or ethnic group."33  The court further
distinguished this case from Turner by noting that Turner involved interra-
cial bias.' In Goins's case, both he and his victims were African-
Americans. 5 The Fourth Circuit went further at this point and said that
no Supreme Court or Fourth Circuit decision has required "that capital
defendants accused of crimes against victims of their own race have a right
to question prospective jurors on the issue of racial bias."'
24. Goins, 226 F.3d at 321-22.
25. 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
26. Goins, 226 F.3d at 321-22; see Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 527 (1973)
(mandating voir dire about racial biases when defendant claimed to be framed for his civil
rights participation).
27. 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
28. Gains, 226 F.3d at 322; see Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37 (1986) (requiring
voir dire regarding racial bias in a capital trial when the defendant and victim are of different
races).




33. Id. at 323 (citation omitted in original).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. (citing Goins v. Angelone, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 671).
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B. Constitutional and Non-Constitutional Rules
While the Fourth Circuit denied Goins the right to ask race-based voir
dire questions, practitioners should note that the court agreed that "the
wiser course generally is to propound appropriate questions designed to
identify racial prejudice if requested by the defendant."" Additionally, the
Supreme Court, using its supervisory authority over federal courts, has
required lower federal courts to permit voir dire questions designed to ferret
out racial bias even when not constitutionally required to do so." Specifi-
cally, the Supreme Court in Rosales-Lopez v. United States" stated that a
federal district court's "[f]ailure to honor [a defendant's) request [to examine
the racial prejudices of potential jurors]... will be reversible error only
where the circumstances of the case indicate that there is a reasonable
possibility that racial or ethnic prejudice might have influenced the jury."'
This "nonconstitutional" standard is triggered when a defendant
demonstrates a "reasonable possibility" that racial bias might influence the
jury.4 This is a considerably lower bar than what is necessary to trigger the
constitutional standard: a "significant likelihood" that racial prejudice
might infect the proceedings."2 In Goins, the court rejected the non-consti-
tutional framework noting that a state trial court is not bound by it."3 In
absence of "special circumstances" that trigger the constitutional right to
inquire into racial bias, voir dire examination lies in the discretion of the
trial judge." Thus, Goins was not constitutionally entitled to ask race-based
questions during voir dire.4
C. Individualized Voir Dire
Goins next contended that the trial court failed to select an impartial
jury because it refused his request to voir dire potential jurors individually.'
Goins argued that pretrial publicity made it necessary to voir dire individu-
37. Id. at 323-24 (citing Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 597 n.9).
38. Id. at 324 (citing Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 597 n.9).
39. 451 U.S. 182 (1981) (plurality).
40. See Goins, 226 F.3d at 324 (citing Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 191
(1981) (plurality)).
41. Id. at 324 n.6 (citing Rosales.Lopez, 451 U.S. at 191).
42. Id. (citing Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 598).
43. Id. at 324; see Dickerson v. United States, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 2333 (2000) (establishing
that with respect to state courts, the Supreme Court's authority is limited to enforcing the
Constitution).
44. Goins, 226 F.3d at 324.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 324-25.
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ally potential jurors.47 The court looked at United States v. Hankish," which
required federal district judges to examine individually thosejurors who
were exposed to prejudicial pretrial publicity to determine the extent of that
exposure.49 The Fourth Circuit dismissed Goins's claim because this safe-
guard is not constitutionally required of the state courts.'
D. Cbange of Venue
Goins received a change of venue from the trial court pursuant to his
request."' The jury was then selected from predominantly white Gloucester
County. 2 In his state habeas petition, Goins contended that this county's
venire denied him the right to a fair trial and an impartial jury." The
Supreme Court of Virginia found that this claim was procedurally defaulted
because Goins failed to raise the issue at trial or on direct appeal.' The
Fourth Circuit ruled that this claim was barred unless Goins could "show
that: (1) there is cause for, and actual prejudice from, the default; or (2) that
failure to review the claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of
justice." 5 The Fourth Circuit decided that Goins made neither showing.'
Defense counsel should be aware of the importance of raising all claims
during trial and on direct appeal in order to preserve appellate issues.5 7
Goins alternately asserted an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for
his attorney's "aquiesc[ence] to the trial court's selection of a group of jurors
with little understanding or exposure to the type of environment [he] was
47. Id. at 325.
48. 502 F.2d 71 (4th Cir. 1974).
49. Goins, 226 F.3d at 325; see United States v. Hankish, 502 F.2d 71,77 (4th Cir. 1974)
(requiring that in federal court, if the trial judge determines that a member of the jury pool
has been exposed to prejudicial pretrial publicity, that juror must be examined individually
to determine the effect of the publicity) (internal citation omitted).
50. Goins, 226 F.3d at 325.
51. Id. at 322 n.4.
52. Id.
53. id.
54. Id.; see Slayton v. Parrigan, 205 S.E.2d 680, 682 (Va. 1974) (prohibiting state habeas
review of claims that were available at trial or on direct appeal and that petitioner failed to
raise at that time).
55. Goins, 226 F.3d at 322 n.4; see Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991)
(barring federal review of defaulted claims unless there is cause for, and actual prejudice from,
the default; or the failure to review the claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of
justice).
56. Goins, 226 F.3d at 322 n.4.
57. Objections must be timely, raised on direct appeal, rely on all possible grounds, and
rely on the same set of facts in order to be preserved properly for appeal in subsequent state
and federal proceedings. See generaly Matthew K. Mahoney, Brid ingthe Procedural Default
Chasm, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 305 (2000) (suggesting method by which defense counsel can "make
record" and avoid procedural default).
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from.""8 Thie Fourth Circuit rejected this claim because Goins failed to
show that his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, or that it prejudiced the trial or sentencing."
E. Epilogue
On December 6, 2000, Christopher Goins was executed by lethal
injection.' ° The United States Supreme Court rejected his appeal and
request for a stay of execution that morning." Virginia Governor Jim
Gilmore denied Goins's request for executive clemency two hours prior to
the execution.6'
Christina S. Pignatelli
58. Goins, 226 F.3d at 327.
59. Id.
60. Frank Green, Injection Ends Lfe of Goins, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Dec. 7,2000, at
Ai.
61. Id. at A22.
62. Id.
2001]

